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ABSTRACT
Multinational firms frequently outsource the manufacturing of their products to factories in lessdeveloped countries to take advantage of much lower labor costs. A tragic disaster occurred in
Bangladesh in April 2013 when a clothing factory building collapsed, killing more than a
thousand workers. Subsequently, textile companies in the U.S. and in Europe who outsource
their manufacturing in Bangladesh had to decide whether to commit to better working conditions
by signing one of two worker safety agreements (WSAs) born in the after-math of the tragedy.
Although many firms signed one of these agreements, many more did not. This study explores
the relationship between an actual corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitment and firm
performance, using a sample of companies who signed one of the WSAs after the Bangladesh
disaster and those who did not. The results suggest that the decision to sign is positively
associated with social visibility, prior CSR performance, and impact in stock price after the
tragedy. Regarding subsequent performance, investors favorably responded to the news of firms’
signing on to the WSA agreement.
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Introduction
In April 2013 more than one thousand workers died when a clothing factory building in
Bangladesh collapsed. Two years later on June 1, 2015, Bangladeshi police filed homicide
charges against 42 people in the 2013 factory collapse (Al-Mahmood, 2015). This and other
disasters have had repercussions for clothing firms outsourcing production to Bangladeshi
factories including liability costs, lower reputation and brand value, customer backlash, higher
monitoring costs, lower stock price, and lower profitability, etc. Since this deadly industrial
disaster, retailers in the U.S. and EU have pledged to improve working conditions in factories
they use in Bangladesh. These sentiments led to two worker safety agreements (WSAs): (1)
European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA), and (2) North American Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA). These agreements make outsourcing more expensive through
higher labor costs and more regulatory and compliance costs, although the EA is much more
stringent than the NAA. Firms who outsource their manufacturing in Bangladesh had to decide
whether to commit to better working conditions (and thus higher labor and regulatory costs) for
factory workers by signing on to one of these safety agreements. Some firms signed one of these
agreements but many others did not.
Legitimacy theory, institutional theory, and instrumental stakeholder theory all suggest that
firms outsourcing in Bangladesh would be motivated to sign one of the safety agreements. First,
it is a signal of long-term commitment to these workers and desire to legitimize itself as a
socially responsible firm. Second, the disaster led to increased pressure within the industry to
make these commitments. Third, an increasing number of key stakeholders care as much or more
about how products are produced as they are about the cost. Yet, in spite of these pressures,
many firms did not sign either of the agreements, presumably due to expectations that the
additional costs would not outweigh rewards.
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Due to availability of corporate social responsibility (CSR) data, we focus on the decision to
sign the NAA agreement. We start by testing factors proposed to have impacted the decision to
sign the NAA, including social visibility, prior CSR performance and disclosures, pre-disaster
financial performance, and impact on stock price after the disaster. Next, we examine the market
reaction to the news that firms commit to sign the NAA. We propose that market reaction is
affected by impact on stock price after the disaster and, further, that investors respond favorably
overall to the signing news.
This study is unique in that we explore the relationship between an unexpected disaster, an
actual CSR commitment, and market reaction. The stock market response to the news of
Bangladesh disaster is likely to be very different from the market reactions to regular earnings
announcements which are usually predicted by analysts and investors. Using a sample of
companies who signed the NAA after the Bangladesh disaster and those who did not, the results
of this study suggest that the decision to sign the NAA agreement is positively associated with
social visibility, prior CSR performance, and impact on stock price after the disaster. However,
pre-disaster financial performance did not significantly positively impact the decision to sign the
NAA. Further, we find evidence that market reaction during the two-day NAA signing
announcement window is favorable, and that the market reaction to the signing is inversely
associated with drop in stock price after the disaster. This result suggests that if firms had lower
than expected market returns around the disaster date, then their returns recovered after they
signed the NAA. Additional analyses using available data for firms signing the EA sample
provide consistent but weaker evidence than the analysis using only the NAA sample.
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Prior literature review and hypotheses
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined as “demands and expectations which
people place on a firm regarding its production of goods and services of both a physical and
social nature” (Zenisek, 1979). Prior research has studied the relationship between CSR
performance in environmental issues and firm financial performance, and contrasting views have
been offered (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield 1985; Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Soloman &
Hansen, 1985). Stakeholder theory suggests that CSR activities are a necessary part of being
sustainable and enhances the satisfaction of more diverse stakeholders (Miles, 2012; Donaldson
& Preston, 1995; Cornell & Shapiro, 1987).
In addition, a firm’s increased CSR activities may improve its reputation, help firms recruit
outstanding quality employees, improve its relationship with regulators, reduce cost by saving
materials and by reducing disposal waste in both short-run and long-run (Fombrun & Shanley
1990; Montgomery & Ramus, 2003). Dowell, Hart, & Yeung (2000) find that multi-national
enterprises (MNEs) that adopt more stringent global environmental standards have higher market
values.
Prior research shows that actual CSR performance and disclosure of CSR performance are
not the same and may impact CSR reputation differently. Brown, Guidry, & Patten (2009) and
Toms (2002) provide evidence of positive associations between the extent of environmental
disclosure and measures of corporate reputation. On the other hand, Cho & Patten (2007) find a
negative relationship between environmental performance and environmental disclosure.
Companies with poor environmental performance often face greater exposure to social and
political pressures and thus have an incentive to use disclosure to enhance their environmental
reputation (see also Hughes, Anderson, & Golden, 2001; Patten, 2002).
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Flammer (2013) finds that companies reported to behave responsibly towards the
environment experience a significant stock price increase, whereas firms that behave
irresponsibly face a significant stock price decrease. And over time, the negative stock market
reaction to eco-harmful behavior has increased, while the positive reaction to eco-friendly
initiatives has decreased.
To measure firms’ CSR performance, prior studies have typically used CSR ratings provided
by the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) index of social performance, BusinessWeek, or Wall
Street Journal. However, these ratings are affected not only by firms’ actual CSR policy but also
by many other items including the amount of CSR disclosure. In this study, we explore the
relationship between an actual CSR commitment and firm performance, using a sample of
companies who signed a WSA after the Bangladesh disaster and those who did not.
Worker safety
Quinlan & Sheldon (2011) discuss the history of enforcement of minimum labor standards
and how the “neo-liberal” ideology1 and rise of finance capital has eroded worker safety laws
and enforcement over recent years. Declining unions and the growth of precarious employment
(especially female and youth) have severely weakened occupational health and safety (OHS)
systems in many countries. Enforcement of OHS laws in recent years has been largely reactive
based on complaints. Intense competition, non-unionized workplaces, and under-resourced
enforcement agencies have all spurred employers to avoid OHS standards and other worker
entitlements. Although wealthier nations made reforms to its labor laws in the early to mid-20th
century, a lack of such progress in poorer countries fueled the emergence of MNEs and the
1

Neo-liberalism is the idea that competitive private markets provide optimal social outcomes and promotes freetrade, open markets, privatization, and deregulation.
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growing influence of neo-liberal ideology. Poorer countries, led by China, became the factory
locations for these MNEs because of lower labor costs. Financial assistance packages from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to poor countries usually contain neoliberal (and anti-labor) requirements attached. Now, debates over worker safety standards are
conducted within governments’ overall response to the current economic crisis. In the wake of
high government debt driven largely by erosion of tax revenues, worker safety is often sacrificed
or ignored in favor of cost cutting and reduced enforcement.
Because of these issues, worker safety standards in developing countries resemble those of
industrialized countries in the early twentieth century. Quinlan & Sheldon (2011) compare
worker-safety and labor standards in industrialized countries versus developing countries.
Appendix A provides part of this comparison relevant to this study. As shown, although worker
safety laws in industrialized countries have eroded somewhat over the years, the laws in
developing countries are either non-existent or little enforced. There are also a high percentage
of factory workers from vulnerable groups such as women, children, and immigrants.
The Bangladesh disaster
Bangladesh is the world’s third largest exporter of apparel, exporting $21.5 billion worth of
apparel in fiscal year 2012-2013 alone. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association reports that in 2012 the garment export industry was responsible for 4 million jobs in
5,600 factories in Bangladesh. The apparel export industry is rapidly growing; throughout the
past 20 years the number of garment factories in Bangladesh increased 264%, and the number of
factory workers increased 400%. Bangladesh’s primary export is Ready-Made Garments
(RMGs), accounting for approximately 80% of the country’s total exports. The traditional
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markets for Bangladesh exports are the European Union, the United States, and Canada but
include several other countries as well.
Although Bangladesh is relied on globally for their RMG exports, the country’s history of
safety issues and fatalities is compromising their position in the apparel manufacturing industry.
The turning points for this industry were the Tazreen factory fire in November 2012 claiming the
lives of over 100 people, and more recently the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in April 2013
killing over 1,100 people. Preliminary investigative reports by the Bangladesh government
found that the Rana Plaza factory was constructed without safety permits (Yardley, 2013). The
factory itself was built on a filled-in pond, compromising the structural integrity of the building.
Additionally, the investigation revealed large cracks in the building caused by generators on the
upper floor, which further compromised the stability of the building and contributed to the
collapse.
There were other factors and responsibilities that led to the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory
as well. Safety audits conducted by an outside inspector were not designed to ensure the
structural safety of factories, but rather check the safety on factory floors (Zain Al-Mahmood,
Passariello & Rana 2013). According to Taplin (2014), other underlying factors contributing to
the disaster included (1) “fast fashion,” (i.e., the need for low cost labor and short lead times to
enable low cost, high turnover “disposable fashion”); (2) concentration of the retail sector; (3)
owners placing profitability over worker safety; (4) political leaders turning a blind eye to
worker safety laws in order to fuel the economy; (5) western retailers detached from the actual
production of garments and weak commitment to social responsibility, and (6) western
consumers unwilling to pay more for clothing.
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Decision to sign worker-safety agreement
In response to the recent industrial tragedies in Bangladesh, retailers, governments, and
organizations around the world have pledged to improve factory working conditions and safety
in Bangladesh. Their commitment has come in the form of two safety agreements: The European
Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA) and the North American Alliance for Bangladesh
Worker Safety (NAA). The EA was signed by over 100 retailers from 19 countries, two global
trade unions, and multiple Bangladeshi unions (Accord 2013a). Currently 26 North American
retailers and a variety of supporting organizations have signed the NAA. Both agreements have
the same objective: to pledge time, money, and resources to improve safety standards and
working conditions in Bangladesh, increasing the importance of corporate social responsibility
versus economic responsibility.
The NAA shares many of the same goals as the EA and contains similar underlying safety
provisions and responsibilities (Alliance 2013a, 2013b). Similar to the EA, the NAA establishes
a Board of Directors with oversight and accountability responsibilities. The Board is responsible
for monitoring the members and ensuring they are complying with the provisions of the
agreement and meeting all self-imposed deadlines. Although the NAA clearly outlines
regulations for fire inspections, safety training, and worker empowerment, it does not explicitly
state the responsibility of signing companies for implementing these regulations. A significant
difference between the EA and the NAA is the severity of remediation. The EA outlines harsher
and more explicit consequences if a factory is not in compliance with the required safety
standards, while the NAA is more collaborative and does not specify the consequences if a
factory is not in compliance. Firms that sign the NAA are not legally bound to any of the
outlined responsibilities. The lack of enforcement has been a source of much criticism for the
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NAA, and many member firms have been accused of creating this plan as a way to evade greater
responsibility in Bangladesh (Inside US Trade, 2013). However, a year after the agreements
were established, they seem to be having some impact. Bangladesh's clothing and textile industry
is struggling to meet safety requirements as factory inspections by NAA and EA officials
increase (Anas 2014).
The NAA does require member firms to contribute annually to a worker/building safety fund
to help pay for factory fire and building safety inspections, worker training, and support for
workers who are temporarily unemployed while factory safety remediation takes place. The fund
also provides affordable capital for building safety. Investors of firms that sign the NAA should
be especially interested in the financial obligations of the agreement. By signing the safety
agreement member firms are pledging money, time, and human resources that could otherwise
be used to increase the firm’s profits. This cash is coming directly out of the bottom line, and
reduces the amount of cash that could be paid back to investors. Additionally, money that
formerly would have been used for research and development or operations improvement is
instead flowing to Bangladesh to support worker safety and sustainability initiatives.
Retailers’ commitment to safety in Bangladesh exemplifies the triple bottom line approach to
sustainability accounting, and balancing three different performance metrics. The triple bottom
line approach, often referred to as ESG reporting, seeks to balance economic, social, and
governance performance metrics. If firms were to pull out of Bangladesh completely in response
to the poor working conditions, they may be subject to higher raw material or manufacturing
costs in other countries, negatively affecting their cost structure and economic performance. By
signing this agreement, they not only increase their social and governance performance, but also
protect their long run economic viability. Signing companies will experience an initial outflow
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of cash for factory improvements and other financial responsibilities under the agreement.
However, financing factory improvements preserves the longevity of the RMG industry in
Bangladesh, and ensures that buyers will continue receiving low cost RMGs from Bangladesh
over the long term.
Firms who outsource their manufacturing in Bangladesh had to decide whether to commit to
signing on to one of the two safety agreements. Although the financial obligation and amount of
cash and other assets pledged by member firms is significant, there are at least three strong
motivations in favor of signing. First, legitimacy theory holds that legitimacy is a necessary
input for an organization's survival and communication strategies can be used as a tool.
Legitimacy includes actions of an entity that are desirable and proper within a socially
constructed system of norms (Cho et al. 2012). After the Bangladesh disaster, society expected
firms outsourcing to factories in Bangladesh to take actions to improve worker safety. Firms who
chose not to take action (e.g., sign on to a safety agreement), would lose legitimacy in society
and suffer negative consequences. On the other hand, signing signals a long-term commitment
for these workers and desire to legitimize itself as a socially responsible firm.
Second, institutional theory argues that in industries with higher institutional norms of CSR,
stakeholders are more responsive to CSR efforts, which in turn may translate into higher returns
from CSR initiatives and higher penalties for those who do not meet those norms (Flammer
2013). The Bangladesh disaster led to increased pressure within the industry to make
commitments like signing a safety agreement. Companies that did not sign could face negative
consequences like lower market price and customer backlash.
Third, instrumental stakeholder theory suggests that CSR efforts can be instrumental in
obtaining necessary resources or stakeholder support (Flammer 2013; Jones 1995). An increasing
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number of key stakeholders (especially consumers) care about how products are produced as
well as the price. Companies that did not sign the agreement risked losing sales to CSR-minded
consumers and potentially lower equity capital.
Prior corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitment
Yet, in spite of these pressures, many firms did not sign either of the Bangladesh safety
agreements. One possible explanation relates to the firms’ level of prior CSR commitment, as
represented by their prior CSR performance. Firms with higher prior CSR commitment may have
already been committed to the health and safety of their outsourcing factories’ workers. It may
have been part of their strategic plan and branding strategy to be aware of their outsourcing
factories and already have strong OHS programs. After the Bangladesh disaster, they would have
been expected by their stakeholders to continue “leading the way” by signing one of the
agreements or risk losing their legitimacy. They would also not want to risk losing their CSRminded customers and other stakeholders.
On the other hand, firms with lower prior CSR commitment are less aware about their
outsourcing firms and the working conditions. It is not part of their strategy to be known for CSR
reputation. In addition to the financial commitment of signing one of the agreements, they would
have to invest more than the higher-CSR firms for monitoring costs to identify their outsourcing
firms and investigate working conditions. These firms tend to choose economic benefits over
social benefits and do not subscribe to the stakeholder theory idea that good CSR performance
leads to better financial performance. Instead, they tend to follow the neo-liberal ideology that
CSR financial commitments reduce profits and should instead be paid back to investors or used
for research and development or operations improvement and not sent to Bangladesh to support
worker safety and sustainability initiatives. Based on these differences, we predict that firms with
10

higher prior CSR commitment were more likely to sign the NAA than firms with lower prior
CSR commitment.
H1a. Outsourcing firms with higher prior CSR commitment are more likely to sign the North
American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA) than those firms with lower prior CSR
commitment.
Social visibility
Another possible explanation relates to the size, media visibility, and brand awareness of the
firm. Sen & Cowley (2013) review the literature comparing and contrasting the commitment to
CSR practices of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) versus larger MNEs and find that CSR is
generally not as critical at SMEs as at MNEs. The dynamics between owners and stakeholders
tends to be different at SMEs than at MNEs. For instance, when certain skills are in demand,
employees with those skills become definitive stakeholders. Sen & Cowley (2013) assert that
social capital theory is more appropriate than stakeholder theory for understanding CSR in
SMEs. Social capital theory emphasizes social networks and relationships and their value within
the business environment. According to Putnam (1993), social capital stems from the networks,
norms, and trust that develop within a group and provides the motivation to pursue shared
objectives of all members in that group. For SMEs, these networks provide access to resources
and information needed to run the business and overcome their small size and lower economies
of scale to be able to compete.
In their qualitative case study of Australian SMEs, Sen & Cowley (2013) find that leaders of
SMEs must undertake many tasks concurrently and are not as aware of issues beyond the day-today operations of the business. In their study, most of the SMEs were not even familiar with the
term “CSR” but used simpler and smaller-scale terms such as “giving back to the community”
11

and “operating the business ethically.” Sen & Cowley (2013, p.423) conclude by stating “…
social responsibility in SMEs is about building relationships and networking with a range of
stakeholders, not judged by their stake in the business, but the social capital these connections
create for the business.”
For these reasons, the strong motivations for signing worker safety agreements cited above
probably apply more to larger firms with high visibility and brand awareness than to smaller
low-profile firms. Regarding the need to legitimize themselves as socially responsible, MNE
firms operate in a larger global socially constructed system of norms. The larger society, which
includes major media outlets, adds greatly to pressures to take actions to improve worker safety.
They are under high scrutiny and publicity through major media outlets and workers’ rights
groups. After the Bangladesh disaster, they would have been expected by their stakeholders to
continue “leading the way” by signing one of the agreements or risk losing their legitimacy. This
increased media attention will have an effect on consumer demand for their products as well as
their market price and ability to generate equity financing. Thus, they are more likely to suffer
negative consequences by not signing than low profile firms who generally do not have these
same global and media pressures.
Smaller firms will often have different instrumental stakeholders than larger firms. For
example, if the firm is under pressure to achieve higher short-term profits to maintain favorable
debt financing, the bank may be their key stakeholder. Other key stakeholders could include a
key customer requiring very low prices or an agent supplier offering the lowest prices but not
concerned about worker safety at its source factories. If they are highly dependent on these key
stakeholders, CSR and worker safety will take a backseat. Further, surveys show consumers are
generally more committed to lower prices for RMGs than to worker safety (Quelch & Rodriguez
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2013; Taplin 2014). Thus, if their customers are not so concerned about worker safety, smaller
firms will place a lower priority on worker safety in Bangladesh factories than large profile firms
who do not want to risk losing their CSR-minded customers and other stakeholders. Unless
smaller firms have an instrumental stakeholder with a high priority on CSR and/or worker safety,
they will be more inclined to follow the neo-liberal ideology that CSR financial commitments
reduce profits, and profits should instead be paid back to investors and not sent to Bangladesh to
support worker safety and sustainability initiatives.
Based on these differences, we predict that larger, high-profile firms with strong brand
awareness were more likely to sign one of the two safety agreements than smaller, low-profile
firms. These predictions lead to our Hypothesis 1b:
H1b. Outsourcing firms with high social visibility due to firm size and brand awareness are
more likely to sign the North American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA) than
firms with lower visibility.
Pre-disaster financial performance
Another possible reason why some firms did not sign the NAA is their weak financial
performance before the disaster. Firms in a stronger financial position would feel better able to
finance the safety agreements’ fiscal responsibilities than firms in a weaker position. To test this
idea, we investigate the pre-disaster financial performance of the firms that signed versus those
that did not sign. Flammer (2013) found that over time, the negative stock market reaction to
eco-harmful behavior has increased, while the positive reaction to eco-friendly initiatives has
decreased. Thus, firms with higher financial performance may expect a greater negative market
impact if they do not sign the NAA than firms with lower financial performance. Smaller firms
will more likely choose the short-term economic benefits of not signing over the stakeholder
13

theory idea that good CSR performance leads to better financial performance. For these reasons,
we expect firms who signed the NAA had a stronger financial position to be able to pledge
resources to Bangladeshi factory workers than firms who did not sign, and also that the signing
firms had higher motivation to do so. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
H1c. Outsourcing firms with higher pre-disaster financial performance are more likely to sign
the NAA than firms with lower prior financial performance.

Impact of Bangladesh disaster on stock price
Related to H1a, H1b, and H1c, we expect the likelihood of signing the NAA is significantly
related to the impact on stock price after the Bangladesh disaster. Investors are usually
considered the primary stakeholder group, at least among public companies, and therefore have
great influence on CSR initiatives. After the Bangladesh disaster, society generally expected
firms outsourcing to factories in Bangladesh to take actions to improve worker safety. If the
stock market expected strong negative societal impact after the Bangladesh disaster for firms
outsourcing in Bangladesh, then the market price would drop substantially. Based on institutional
and instrumental stakeholder theories, the more the market reacted to the Bangladesh disaster,
the more firms were motivated to sign the NAA to send a positive signal to the markets and help
reverse the stock price impact. Conversely, we expect that when the market impact to the
Bangladesh disaster was not as strong, firms will feel less motivated to satisfy the stakeholders
through signing the NAA. For these reasons, we test the following hypothesis:
H1d. Outsourcing firms with more negative impact on stock price after the Bangladesh disaster
were more likely to sign the NAA than firms with less impact on stock price.
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Post tragedy performance
After the Bangladesh disaster, there were repercussions for clothing firms outsourcing
production to Bangladeshi factories including liability costs, lower reputation and brand value,
customer backlash, and higher monitoring costs. Prior studies have found significant market and
financial performance consequences for both positive and negative environmental news. Dowell,
Hart, & Yeung (2000) find that MNEs adopting a stringent global environmental standard have
higher market values, suggesting these firms will generally experience higher firm value.
Flammer (2013) found that companies making negative environmental news suffered a
significant stock price decrease around the event date. Conversely, firms making positive
environmental news experienced a significant stock price increase.
In this study, we examine the impact of adopting more stringent worker safety standards on
firm financial and market performance. On one hand, committing to one of the safety agreements
should enhance the firm’s CSR reputation. According to the instrumental stakeholder theory,
positive CSR efforts will help gain or keep key stakeholders such as CSR-minded customers and
investors. These key stakeholders have a positive effect on financial and market performance due
to increased sales, new resources, and higher demand for company stock. In addition, there may
be a perception among key stakeholders that signing the NAA will result in fewer catastrophic
factory disasters for these firms in the future. Conversely, signing one of the safety agreements
will presumably lead to resources going to support Bangladeshi worker safety instead of R&D,
short-term profits, and dividends. However, we expect the positive outcomes to outweigh the
negative outcomes based on prior research showing that MNEs that adopt more stringent global
environmental standards generally experience higher firm value than firms that do not (Dowell,
Hart, & Yeung 2000).
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We explore the relationship between an actual CSR worker safety commitment and firm
value, using a sample of companies who signed the NAA after the Bangladesh disaster and those
who did not sign. If acting responsibly toward environmental issues increases firms’ perceived
and actual CSR performance, and increased CSR performance leads to increased sales,
resources, and perceived value, we expect investors to value firms higher for NAA signers than
non-signers after the Bangladesh disaster. Therefore, we predict that the market will react
positively to the NAA signing announcement and test the following hypothesis:
H2a. Investors respond favorably during the announcement window to the news that firms
commit to sign the NAA.
We also expect that market reaction to signing the NAA is associated with the market
reaction after the Bangladesh disaster. For firms with higher negative impact on market price
after the Bangladesh disaster, the higher the rise needed to get back to “normal” returns after
signing. Firms with lower negative market reaction after the Bangladesh disaster will see a
smaller rise after signing because less is needed to get back to normal returns. Further, higher
market reaction after the disaster also reflects the level of attention given to the firm, suggesting
higher market reaction after the signing announcement. For these reasons, we test the following
hypothesis:

H2b. Market reaction to the news of signing the NAA is associated with market reaction after
the disaster.
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Sample and methodology
Sample
Because of limited data availability for European signing firms, we must focus primarily on
U.S. outsourcing firms signing or not signing the NAA. Global Compustat database does not
provide advertising expense. Also, KLD database provides CSR scores only for the U.S.
companies. Therefore, we were not able to incorporate these two variables in our analyses for the
EA and the NAA and EA combined sample. The NAA sample consists of 16 U.S. companies
that signed the NAA, with financial data available in Compustat and CSR data available in KLD
database. In Appendix B we report the list of our 16 sample NAA signing firms, together with
the list of 22 EA signing firms.2
Methodology
To test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, we use multivariable logit model. The dependent
variable in the logit model is an indicator (0,1) variable, Commitmentit, which takes the value of
one if a firm signed the NAA agreement, otherwise zero. We examine the relations between
commitment to sign the NAA agreement and (H1a) firms’ prior CSR performance using firms’
CSR score, (H1b) social visibility based on firms’ market capitalization and advertising
spending, and (H1c) pre-disaster financial performance based on income, and (H1d) market

2

The NAA and the EA maintain their own websites. The list of NAA and EA signing firms can be obtained from
their corresponding websites: http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org and http://bangladeshaccord.org, respectively.
We identified our NAA and EA sample firms from these websites during fall 2013. We hand-collected the signing
dates of firms who signed the NAA and the EA by searching various sources of news media such as newswires,
newspapers, and press conference. For example, a business news article posted by Reuters on July 10, 2013
confirms that 12 out of our 16 NAA sample firms signed the NAA on July 10, 2013. The Reuter article can be found
at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-factories-northamerica-idUSBRE9690IR20130710. Other sources
include The New York Times (May 15, 2013), ILRF (International Labor Rights Forum) press releases (July 12,
2013), NPR news (August, 21, 2013), and others.
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reactions using buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered on the date of the disaster. We will do
this by estimating the following logit model (1):
Commitmentit = 0 + 1*CSR-Netit-1 + 2*CSR-Strengthit-1 +3*CSR-Concernit-1 +4*Sizeit-1
+5*Advit-1 + 6*Eit-1 + 7* Dividendit-1 +8* Debtit-1 +9* Disaster-Returnsit + ɛi
where:
Commitmentit
CSR-Netit-1
CSR-Strengthit-1
CSR-Concernit-1
Sizeit-1

Advit-1
Eit-1
Divit-1
Debtit-1
Disaster-Returnsit

(1)

= an indicator variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm signed the NAA agreement in
2013, 0 if a firm did not;
= the CSR net (strengths minus concerns) scores obtained from KLD 2012 index;
= the CSR strength scores at the various category levels obtained from the Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) 2012 index;
= the CSR concerns scores obtained from KLD 2012 index;
= the natural logarithm of firm i’s market capitalization, calculated as fiscal-year
closing stock price multiplied by number of outstanding common shares for
period t-1;
= firm i’s advertising intensity (advertising expense divided by sales) for year t-1;
= firm i’s income before extraordinary items, divided by sales for year t-1;
= firm i’s dividend yield (dividend per share divided by price per share) for year t-1;
= firm i’s debt to asset ratio (long-term debt divided by total assets) for year t-1;
= Firm’s two-day (day 0 and day +1) buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered around
the Bangladesh Disaster event date (April 24, 2013 when the Rama factory building
collapsed in Bangladesh), when abnormal returns are measured by firm-returns
minus equally-weighted market returns.

To test H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d, our main focus is on the signs and the magnitude of the
coefficients, 1 through 6, as well as 9.
To test H2a and H2b empirically, we use an event study model modified from those
suggested in prior studies, such as Easton & Harris (1991) and Khurana & Lippincott (2000).
We use the following OLS regression model (2) to investigate the association between buy-andhold abnormal returns and the signing of the North American Agreements (H2a) and market
reaction after the disaster (H2b).
Signing-Returnsit = 0 + 1* Commitmentit +2* CSR-Netit-1 + 3*CSR-Strengthit-1 +4*CSR-Concernit-1
+ 5*Sizeit-1 + 6*Advi-1 + 7*Eit-1 + 8*Divit-1 + 9*Debtit-1 + 10*Disaster-Returnsit + ɛi
(2)
where:
Signing-Returnsit

= Firm’s two-day (day +1 and day +2) buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered around
the NAA Signing event date, when abnormal returns are measured by firm-returns
minus equally-weighted market returns;
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Commitmentit
CSR-Netit-1
CSR-Strengthit-1
CSR-Concernit-1
Sizeit-1

Advit-1
Eit-1
Divit-1
Debtit-1
Disaster-Returnsit

= an indicator variable, that takes the value of 1 if a firm signed the NAA agreement in
2013, 0 if a firm did not;
= the CSR net (strengths minus concerns) scores obtained from KLD 2012 index;
= the CSR strength scores at the various category levels obtained from the Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) 2012 index;
= the CSR concerns scores obtained from KLD 2012 index;
= the natural logarithm of firm i’s market capitalization, calculated as fiscal-year
closing stock price multiplied by number of outstanding common shares
for period t-1;
= firm i’s advertising intensity (advertising expense divided by sales) for year t-1;
= firm i’s income before extraordinary items, divided by sales for year t-1;
= firm i’s dividend yield (dividend per share divided by price per share) for year t-1;
= firm i’s debt to asset ratio (long-term debt divided by total assets) for year t-1;
= Firm’s two-day (day 0 and day +1) buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered around
the Bangladesh Disaster event date (April 24, 2013 when the Rama factory building
collapsed in Bangladesh), when abnormal returns are measured by firm-returns
minus equally-weighted market returns.

Summary statistics
In Table 1, we report the summary statistics of our key variables for the sample of 16 NAA
signing firms and of 40 non-signing firms. The 40 non-signing firms are from the same industries
as signing firms, but these firms have not signed the NAA. Specifically, the 40 NAA non-signing
firms are all the firms who belong to the same four-digit SIC industries as the signing firms.3
The upper part of Table 1 presents the comparison results of raw variables. The signing firms
have a statistically significantly higher (p < .01 or p < .05) level of total assets, income before
extraordinary items, sales, price, market value, stockholder’s equity, long-term debt, advertising
expense, dividends, and operating cash flow, using paired 2-sided t-test for mean difference and

3

We use a 1-to-1 matched pairs design for analyses using the EA sample. The EA analyses are presented in
additional analyses section. For the NAA analyses, we use a 1-to-n matched pairs design because of the small NAA
sample size (16 observations). To find the EA matched non-signing firms, we searched for firms that were closest in
size (total assets) within the same 4-digit SIC industry, country, and year. A matched pairs design on these factors is
appropriate to reduce heterogeneity issues for the analysis. For the NAA analysis, we included all non-signing firms
in the same 4-digit industry as the signing firms within the same year. All of our NAA sample firms are U.S. firms.
Because of the limited sample size of 16 NAA signing firms, we did not use a 1-to-1 matching for the analysis.
Nonetheless, to validate the legitimacy of our NAA analysis, we repeated the tests using the non-signing firms that
were closest in size (total assets) within the same 4-digit SIC industry and year. The results of the 1-to-1 matched
pairs analysis for the NAA sample are qualitatively consistent with those from the analysis using 1-to-n matched
pairs.
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paired 2-sided Wilcoxon Z-test for median difference. Therefore, compared to the non-signing
firms, the signing companies seem to be more socially visible and prominent firms.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The lower part of Table 1 presents the results for the comparisons of scaled variables. The
NAA signing firms have a statistically significantly higher level of Size (natural logarithm of
market value of equity) and Debt (long-term debt divided by total assets), using paired 2-sided ttest for mean difference and Wilcoxon Z-test for median difference. The scaled variable
comparison confirms that signing firms are more likely to be bigger and to have a higher level of
debt than non-signing firms. In sum, the results reported in Table 1 for the comparisons of raw
and scaled variables provide evidence that the NAA signing firms are likely to be bigger in terms
of size (total assets, sales, market value of equity), and to have a higher level of advertising
expenses spent, the amount of dividends paid, and long-term debt. These results suggest that to
test our hypotheses, we must control for variation in these confounding firm characteristics
between the signing and the non-signing firms.
In Table 1, we also report two-day (day 0 and day 1) buy-and-hold abnormal returns around
the Bangladesh Rama factory disaster date and the signing date of NAA. The Bangladesh
disaster event date is when the factory building collapsed on April 24, 2013 Wednesday at about
08:57 a.m. local Bangladesh time. The disaster was released through news media immediately to
the world. The news reached U.S. investors after the closing of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) on Day -1 (April 23, 2013 Tuesday at around 10:57 p.m. Eastern Standard Time). We
use several different methods to measure returns, such as buy-and-hold abnormal returns,
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and simple sum of raw returns. For buy-and-hold abnormal
returns and CAR, we adjust cumulative returns using equal-weighted market index or value-
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weighted market index. For the brevity of presentation, we report only buy-and-hold abnormal
returns using equal-weighted market index in Table 1, but the results using other return measures
are qualitatively the same.
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the two day (day 0 and day +1) period around the
disaster date suggest lower levels of returns for signing companies than those for non-signing
firms (mean of 0.0170 versus 0.0185, respectively). Although not statistically significant due at
least in part to low sample size, this result provides evidence of the severity of Bangladesh Rama
factory disaster news to investors in the U.S.
Our thorough daily return analyses (for brevity the results are not all reported in Table 1)
show that unlike the Bangladesh Rama factory disaster news, the signing NAA news
disseminated to investors rather slowly during the next two trading days in the U.S. stock market.
Therefore, we select day +1 and day +2 daily returns to construct our cumulative buy-and-hold
abnormal returns measure after the NAA signing date. In Table 1, buy-and-hold abnormal
returns over the two day (day +1 and day +2) period after the NAA signing date show higher
levels of returns for signing companies than those for non-signing firms. This result suggests that
investors may have favorably responded to the news of signing NAA. However, univariate tests
fail to provide statistically significant evidence of differences between signing and non-signing
firms in terms of market returns after the signing date.
In Table 2, we compare the pre-disaster CSR performance between our 16 sample signing
and 40 non-signing firms, matched on industry. Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) index
presents seven CSR categories: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee
Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product. Appendix C presents the detailed KLD
category descriptions. For each of the seven categories, we analyze (1) strengths, (2) concerns,
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and (3) net (strengths minus concerns) scores. As reported in Table 2, sample firms have
significantly stronger CSR performance overall and for four CSR categories of Community,
Diversity, Employee Relations, and Environment, relative to non-signing firms (the difference is
statistically significant at the 1% level; for Environment, the difference is statistically significant
at the 10% level) in terms of net (strengths minus concerns) scores.4
Further, total strengths and net difference (strengths minus concerns) are both statistically
significantly higher (p = .01) using the two-sided paired t-test for signing firms compared to nonsigning firms. These results suggest that NAA signing firms, on average, are likely to be stronger
prior CSR performers, relative to non-signing firms.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Main results
Testing the decision to sign hypotheses (1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d)
In Table 3, we report the results of logistic regressions with the decision to sign or not to sign
on to the NAA as the dependent variable in the model. We report the results of six model
specifications with different combinations of CSR measures and other variables. In all six
models, the dependent variable, Commitment, is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a
firm signed on to the NAA agreement and 0 if a firm did not.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In Models (1), (3), and (5), the coefficient estimate on CSR-Net is positive. In Model (1), the
CSR-Net coefficient estimate (0.501) is statistically significantly positive with p-value of less
than .01 (χ2-value = 8.68). In Model (3), the CSR-Net coefficient estimate (0.554) is statistically

The responses (scores) in the “human rights” category are too few to perform meaningful comparisons. In fact, in
the 2012 KLD database, the mean values for “strengths” and “concerns” are zero for both the signing and the nonsigning group firms, which make comparisons for this sub-category impossible.
4
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significantly positive with p-value of less than .05 (χ2-value = 3.92). In Model (5), the coefficient
estimate, 0.549, is marginally significant with p-value of less than .10. In addition, in Model (2),
the CSR-Strength coefficient estimate (0.741) is statistically significantly positive with p-value of
less than .01 (χ2-value = 10.35). Also, in Model (4), the CSR-Strength coefficient estimate, 0.607,
is marginally significant with p-value of less than .10. This result indicates that the stronger prior
CSR performance a firm had shown, the more likely it was to sign on to the North American
Agreement. We have tested various additional model specifications (the results are not all
reported in Table 3 for brevity) and find the sign on CSR variable is consistently positive
throughout the models. Although not all are statistically significant at a p-value less than .05,
such as Model (5), the results overall provide strong evidence that signing firms are likely to be
more socially responsible firms. This result provides support for Hypothesis 1a.
The results also provide evidence that signing firms are likely to be more prominently large
firms within the industry which supports Hypothesis 1b. The positive coefficient on Size is
consistent throughout all four model specifications, Models (3), (4), (5), and (6) where the
variable is operationalized (p < .05). This result provides evidence that the larger a firm is, the
more likely it was to sign the NAA. The coefficient on Adv (advertising expense divided by
sales) is not significant. Although total advertising expense is much greater for the larger signing
firms, when scaled by sales there is little difference between the two groups.
In Models (3) through (6) in Table 3, we find some evidence that higher E (margin ratio:
income before extraordinary items divided by sales) firms are less likely to sign on to the NAA
agreement. The E variable is statistically marginally significant with p-values of less than .10.
Thus, instead of being more likely to sign as we expected, firms with higher pre-disaster margins
were less likely to sign the NAA when other factors are considered. This result fails to support
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our Hypothesis 1c. One possible explanation is that older more established companies in readymade-garment (RMG) industries have more competition and thus lower operating margins.
Lastly, in Models (3) through (6), the sign on the coefficient of Disaster-Returns, the variable
operationalizing returns after the Bangladesh disaster (BD), is positive. Disaster-Returns is buyand-hold abnormal returns of day 0 and day 1 after the building collapse disaster minus equallyweighted market returns. In all four models, the coefficient estimate is statistically significant
(p<.05). Contrary to our Hypothesis 1d, this result suggests that firms with more positive stock
returns after the disaster event date were more likely to sign on to the NAA. Presumably,
investors expected the healthier and larger signing firms would respond to such disasters in a
more socially responsible manner, so the stock market response to Bangladesh disaster is
positive for these high profile firms. This result fails to support Hypothesis 1d.
Testing the market reaction hypotheses (2a and 2b)
In Table 4, we report the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the two-day
buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the NAA signing date as the dependent variable in the
model. We use several different proxies to measure buy-and-hold abnormal returns, but report
only the results of three different model specifications because the other results are consistent to
the ones reported.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In all three models, the variable of our interest, Commitment, has consistently positive signs.
Commitment is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to the NAA
Agreement and 0 if a firm did not. In Model (1) the coefficient of Commitment is positively
associated with the two-day (day +1 and day +2) buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the signing
date, with statistical significance at the p < .05 level. For Models (2) and (3), the positive
coefficient estimate of Commitment is at the p < .10 level. This finding provides evidence that
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the signing firms had higher abnormal returns after they sign the NAA, thus supporting
Hypothesis 2a.
Lastly, in Models (1), (2), and (3), we find that the variable for buy-and-hold abnormal
returns after the disaster event, Disaster-Returns, is negatively associated with the buy-and-hold
abnormal returns around the signature date, Signing-Returns. In Model (1), the coefficient
estimate of Disaster-Returns is -0.630 and highly statistically significant (p < .001).
Additionally, in Models (2) and (3), the negative coefficient estimate of Disaster-Returns is also
highly statistically significant (p < .001). This result indicates that if a firm had large negative
stock returns around the disaster, they gain back abnormally high returns around the signature
date. These results are robust in all three different models and support Hypothesis 2b.
Additional analyses
European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA)
Although not all the same information is available, we performed additional analysis for
firms who sign the European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA). As shown in Appendix
B, the 22 sample EA signing companies are from 10 different countries, including the UK,
Germany, France, Sweden, and Australia. In Panel A of Table 5, we report the summary
statistics of key variables for the EA sample and their non-signing firms, matched by country,
industry, and year.5
All variables in Table 5 are measured in U.S. dollars. The results in Table 1 show that the
NAA signing firms are statistically significantly larger in total assets, have more long-term debt,

5

Specifically, the matched control firm we chose for each EA signatory company is the firm with the most similar
size of total assets (the next smallest or largest) within a specific 4-digit SIC industry in the same country and year.
All matched control firms did not sign the EA agreement.
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and have a higher level of sales, stockholders’ equity, and dividends than the non-signing firms.
However, in Panel A of Table 5, we do not find any significant differences in any of these
variables between the EA signing firms and non-signing firms, matched by country, industry,
and year. The only variable that is significantly different is market value of equity (p < .01 for
mean difference, and p < .05 for median difference). In addition, the results for the comparisons
between scaled variables provide some evidence that the EA signing firms have statistically
significantly higher levels of Size (log of market value of equity). The mean (median) difference
is statistically significant at the 10% (5%) level using the two-sided paired t-test (Wilcoxon nonparametric test).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In Panel B of Table 5, we report the summary statistics of key variables for the combined
NAA and EA sample and their industry-matched non-signing firms. Our combined sample
includes 16 NAA and 22 EA signing firms. The combined non-signing group includes 40 NAA
non-signing firms, matched by industry and year, and 22 EA non-signing firms, matched by
country, industry, and year. The results provide evidence that the NAA and EA signing firms
have a statistically significantly higher level of total assets, sales, market value of equity,
stockholders’ equity, long-term debt, and dividends, using paired two-sided t-tests for mean
difference and paired two-sided Wilcoxon Z-tests for median difference.
The lower part of Panel B of Table 5 presents the results for the comparisons of scaled
variables. The NAA and EA signing firms have a statistically significantly higher level of Size
(natural logarithm of market value of equity) and Debt (long-term debt divided by total assets),
using paired 2-sided t-test for mean difference and Wilcoxon Z-test for median difference (pvalue < .01). In sum, the univariate comparisons using the combined NAA and EA sample
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confirm our prediction that compared to the non-signing firms, the NAA and EA signing
companies are likely to be prominent firms in terms of their size and are more socially visible.
In Table 6, we report the results of logistic regressions with the decision to sign on to the
agreement as the dependent variable in the model. The dependent variable Commitment is an
indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to either the NAA or the EA agreement
and 0 if a firm did not. As mentioned previously, data for the two key variables, CSR and Adv, in
the model are not available for the EA signing firms because Global Compustat does not provide
advertising expense, and KLD provides CSR scores only for U.S. companies. Therefore, we are
not able to incorporate these two variables in the regressions when using the combined NAA and
EA sample.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results in Table 6 provide evidence that Size is positively related to Commitment (pvalues < .01), indicating that larger firms are more likely to sign either the NAA or the EA than
smaller firms. The results using the EA sample only (unreported) are consistent with those of the
combined sample. Therefore, the results using the combined NAA and EA sample provide
consistent evidence that signing firms are likely to be more prominent within the industry. This
result is consistent with our Hypothesis 1b.
In Models (1), (2) and (4), we find evidence that the coefficient of E is negative, which
means that higher E (margin ratio: income before extraordinary items divided by sales) firms are
less likely to sign on to either the NAA or the EA agreement. In Models (1) and (2), the
coefficient of E is statistically significant with p-values of less than .05. This result is not
consistent with our Hypothesis 1c. Again, a possible explanation is that more established
companies have more competition and thus lower operating margins.
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Lastly, in Models (2) and (4), the sign on the coefficient of Disaster-Returns, the variable
operationalizing returns after the Bangladesh disaster (BD), is negative, but is not statistically
significant. The results using the EA sample only (unreported) are consistent and thus do not
support Hypothesis 1d.
In Table 7, we report the results of OLS regressions with the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal
returns after the NAA and the EA signing date as the dependent variable in the model. The
variable of interest, Commitment, is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on
to the NAA or the EA and 0 if a firm did not. In all three models, the coefficient of Commitment
has a positive sign but is not statistically significant, thus failing to support Hypothesis 2a.
Regarding the association between market reaction to signing news being associated with
market reaction after the disaster (Hypothesis 2d), models (1), (2), and (3) in Table 7 all show the
variable for buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the disaster event, Disaster-Returns, is
negatively associated with the buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the signature date, SigningReturns. In Model (1), the coefficient is -0.248 with the p-value of less than 0.01 (p < .05 for
models (2) and (3)). This result indicates that if a firm had large negative stock returns around
the disaster, they will gain back abnormally high returns around the signature date. These results
support our Hypothesis 2b and are consistent with the analysis using the NAA sample alone.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Table 7 includes a binary (0,1) variable equal to one for a U.S. firm (otherwise zero). As
reported, this variable is negatively associated with the buy-and-hold abnormal returns around
the signature date. This result suggests that U.S. firms experienced lower abnormal stock returns
around the signature date than non-U.S. firms. This result may tie back to the more stringent
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requirements of the EA compared to the NAA or that signing the EA was more important to nonU.S. investors than signing the NAA was to U.S. investors.
Conclusions
This study is unique and contributes to prior CSR accounting literature. We explore the
relationship between an actual CSR commitment and market reaction using a sample of
companies who signed the NAA after the Bangladesh disaster and those who did not. The
announcement of this type of action is different from market reactions to other types of CSR
actions that are usually combined with earnings announcements. The Bangladesh disaster was a
totally unexpected surprise to the market and signing one of the worker safety agreements was a
unique CSR action separate from other news items about the company.
It is the first study to examine directly stock market reactions to the Bangladesh disaster and
what types of firms decided to commit to one of the stringent worker safety agreements in its
wake. We also believe it to be the first study that directly examines the market response to news
events that are solely associated with CSR that do not also include news components about
company financial results.
The stock market response to the news of Bangladesh disaster is likely to be very different
from the market reactions to regular earnings announcements. Earnings announcements are
usually very much predicted by analysts and investors. The Bangladesh disaster was a totally
unexpected surprise to the market. The important subsequent events (reactions from labor
unions, multinational companies, and governments, etc.) continued to occur many days after the
disaster.
The results of the univariate comparison between the signing and the non-signing firms using
the CSR scores obtained from the KLD index provide evidence that the signing firms had
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significantly higher prior CSR performance than the non-signing firms. Furthermore, from our
logistic regression results, we find that firms with higher prior CSR performance and social
visibility measured by firm size were more likely to commit to a major Bangladesh worker safety
agreement (the NAA) than those with lower stature.
Our results are consistent with the suggestions by Sen & Cowley (2013). CSR is generally
not as critical at small and medium-sized companies because of the value they place on social
networks and relationships, providing the resources and information needed to compete. Larger
multinational companies, however, are under more pressure from media outlets and workers’
rights groups. They must legitimize themselves as socially responsible; otherwise they will suffer
negative consequences of not signing, such as negative publicity, decreased consumer demand,
and lower market price. Because their instrumental stakeholders are different from the smaller
and medium-sized companies, they feel the need to follow the industry norms for worker safety.
Further, they are also more likely to have already invested in worker safety programs at their
outsourcing firms, making it easier for them to commit to a more stringent agreement than for
firms who have not previously worried about worker safety.
We expected that committing to a stringent worker safety program to be positively associated
with strong pre-disaster financial performance as measured by the margin ratio. However, we
found that pre-disaster financial performance is negatively associated with the commitment of
signing on to the NAA when size is controlled in the multi-variate regressions. We also
hypothesized a negative association between the impact of the disaster on stock price and
commitment to sign. Instead, firms with more positive stock returns after the Bangladesh
disaster were more likely to sign the agreement. These results suggest that signing firms tended
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to be larger and more mature companies, with high social visibility and CSR effort that were
perhaps considered better able to “weather the storm” than smaller firms in the growth stage.
Based on the customer survey results reported in Quelch & Rodriguez (2013), many
consumers have responded that they do not consider the Bangladesh factory disaster as an
important event (factor) that will alter their buying behavior patterns. However, our results show
that our sample NAA signing firms experienced statistically higher market reactions around the
signing date than the non-signing-group firms. This result provides evidence that investors
reacted positively to the news even though many consumers did not consider this news to be
important for their buying behavior. This finding re-confirms the importance of CSR to the
stock market.
Regarding post-tragedy performance, we do not find that size, margin ratio, dividends, or
advertising spending affect two-day market reactions to the CSR commitment. However, as
hypothesized, the market responded favorably during the announcement window to the news that
firms committed to sign the NAA. Furthermore, the market reaction to the signing event is
negatively related to the market reaction after the original disaster. One explanation is that the
bigger the drop in price after the disaster, the higher the increase in price needed after the
commitment to the safety agreement to return to “normal” returns.
Our additional analyses including firms signing the European Accord (EA) provide mostly
consistent but weaker evidence than when using the NAA sample only. However, we were not
able to test the CSR variable because that data is not available for non-U.S. firms. We did find a
significant difference between market reactions for U.S. firms around the signature date than for
non-U.S. firms.
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The findings of this study must be considered in light of its limitations. The long-term
market reaction to the signing of a major worker safety agreement cannot be measured within 12 day announcement window. Important subsequent events will continue to occur and may alter
the market’s initial reaction. Also, it is difficult to attribute market impact to any one given
factor, such as announcing a commitment to sign a worker safety agreement in a country far
away from U.S. markets. Probably the most serious limitation of this study is the relatively small
sample size, which is due to the lack of data available for many companies and the relatively
small number of U.S. firms signing the safety agreement.
In spite of these limitations, we believe this study sheds light on how companies respond to
worker safety disasters, decide to take challenging CSR actions, and how the market responds to
these actions. Future research can investigate whether similar phenomenon occur with other
types of specific CSR actions, such as hazardous waste disasters, diversity-related initiatives,
charitable giving, volunteer programs, investment practices, plant closings, political support, etc.
We hope this study contributes to the growing research on the long-term benefits and costs of
CSR practices and will help promote good global corporate social and ethical conduct.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of Worker-Safety and Labor Standards
Type of Standard
Minimum labor standards
and union recognition
/bargaining laws (wages and
hours)
Extent of vulnerable groups
of workers

Extent of occupational
health and safety laws

Industrialized Countries
Minimum wage and hours
laws with some erosion

Developing Countries
No or ineffective minimum
wage and hours laws, little
collective regulation

Vulnerable groups expand
(women, home-workers,
immigrants, old and young
child labor re-emerges)
Expanded OHS law but under
indirect threat

Highly exploited vulnerable
groups (children, women,
immigrants, homeless,
indentured labor)
Little OHS law and little
enforced (only formal
sector)

Source: Quinlan and Sheldon (2011)
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APPENDIX B
List of Sample Signing Firms for Bangladesh Worker Safety Agreement
North American Alliance (NAA)
Company Name
Country
CARTER'S
USA
PVH
USA
VF
USA
JONES GROUP
USA
KOHL'S
USA
MACY'S
USA
PENNEY (J C)
USA
SEARS HOLDINGS
USA
TARGET
USA
WAL-MART STORES
USA
COSTCO WHOLESALE
USA
AMERN EAGLE OUTFITTERS
USA
CHILDRENS PLACE
USA
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH
USA
GAP
USA
NORDSTROM
USA
European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA)
DEBENHAMS
Great Britain
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP
Great Britain
TESCO
Great Britain
JOHN LEWIS PARTNERSHIP
Great Britain
SAINSBURY
Great Britain
MOTHERCARE
Great Britain
NEXT
Great Britain
N BROWN GROUP
Great Britain
ADIDAS
Germany
PUMA
Germany
CARREFOUR SUPERMARCHE
France
CASINO GUICHARD-PERRACHON
France
STOCKMANN
Finland
PACIFIC BRANDS
Australia
WOOLWORTHS
Australia
SPECIALTY FASHION GROUP
Australia
HENNES & MAURITZ
Sweden
KAPPAHL
Sweden
IC GROUP
Denmark
LPP
Poland
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Currency Code
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar
US Dollar

SIC
2300
2300
2320
2330
5311
5311
5311
5311
5331
5331
5399
5600
5600
5651
5651
5651

British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
British Pound
Euro
Euro
Euro
Euro
Euro
Australian Dollar
Australian Dollar
Australian Dollar
Swedish Krona
Swedish Krona
Danish Krone
Polish Zloty

5311
5311
5399
5411
5411
5600
5651
5961
3021
3021
5399
5411
5311
2300
5411
5621
5621
5651
2300
2300

CHARLES VOGELE HLDG
FAST RETAILING CO

Switzerland
Japan

Swiss Franc
Japanese Yen

Industry Code (from www.SICCODE.COM):
2300: Apparel and other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and Similar Materials
2320: Men's and Boys' Furnishings, Work Clothing, and Allied Garments
2330: Women's, Misses', and Juniors' Outerwear
3021: Rubber and Plastics Footwear
5311: Department stores
5331: Variety Stores
5399: Miscellaneous general merchandise stores
5411: Grocery Stores
5600: Apparel and Accessory Stores
5621: Women's clothing stores
5651: Family clothing stores
5961: Catalog and Mail-Order Houses
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5651
5600

APPENDIX C
List of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Categories in
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) Index
1. Community
Strengths: Charitable Giving; Innovative Giving; Non-US Charitable Giving; Support for Housing;
Support for Education; Indigenous People Relations; Volunteer Programs; Other Strength.
Concerns: Investment Controversies; Negative Economic Impact; Indigenous People Relations;
Tax Disputes; Other Concern.
2. Corporate Governance
Strengths: Limited Compensation; Ownership Strength; Transparency Strength;
Political Accountability Strength; Other Strength.
Concerns: High Compensation; Ownership Concern; Accounting Concern; Transparency Concern;
Political Accountability Concern; Other Concern.
3. Diversity
Strengths: CEO; Promotion; Board of Directors; Work/Life Benefits; Women & Minority
Contracting; Employment of the Disabled; Gay & Lesbian Policies; Other Strength.
Concerns: Controversies; Non-Representation; Other Concern.
4. Employee Relations
Strengths: Union Relations; No-Layoff Policy; Cash Profit Sharing; Employee Involvement;
Retirement Benefits Strength; Health and Safety Strength; Other Strength.
Concerns: Union Relations; Health and Safety Concern; Workforce Reductions;
Retirement Benefits Concern; Other Concern.
5. Environment
Strengths: Beneficial Products and Services; Pollution Prevention; Recycling; Clean Energy;
Communications; Property, Plant, and Equipment; Other Strength.
Concerns: Hazardous Waste; Regulatory Problems; Ozone Depleting Chemicals; Substantial
Emissions; Agricultural Chemicals; Other Concern.
6. Human Rights
Strengths: Positive Record in South Africa; Indigenous People Relations Strength;
Labor Rights Strength; Other Strength.
Concerns: South Africa; Northern Ireland; Burma Concern; Mexico; Labor Rights Concern
Indigenous People Relations Concern; Other Concern.
7. Product
Strengths: Quality; R&D/Innovation; Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged; Other Strength.
Concerns: Product Safety; Marketing/Contracting Concern; Antitrust; Other Concern.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for North American Alliance (NAA)
Signing Firms

Non-Signing Firms

Mean

Difference (p-value)
Wilcoxon
t-test
test
0.006
<0.001
0.035
0.016
0.012
<0.001

Raw Variables ($mil):

Mean

Median

Mean

Total Assets
Income before Ext. Items
Sales

24,080.7
1,635.8
50,013.0

8,861.0
584.4
12,566.5

1,778.6
205.3
3,371.9

957.0
65.3
1,664.6

22,302.1***
1,430.5**
46,641.1**

Common Shares Outstand.
Price close - Fiscal
Market Value
Stockholders’ Equity
Long-term Debt

412.6
57.9
25,787.0
8,882.7
5,187.7

194.8
49.9
9,471.7
3,032.5
1,752.5

90.1
35.3
3,710.9
932.7
233.0

47.9
30.0
1,200.3
448.1
29.1

322.5**
22.6**
22,076.1**
7,950.0***
4,954.7***

0.014
0.023
0.017
0.008
0.003

0.001
0.011
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Advertising Expense
Dividends-Common Stock
Operating Cash flow
Scaled Variables:
Size

649.3
536.9
2,739.5

467.9
230.0
897.1

54.5
43.3
296.3

22.6
3.4
87.2

594.8***
493.6**
2,443.2**

<0.001
0.020
0.016

0.002
0.002
0.002

9.096

9.152

7.174

7.089

1.922***

<0.001

<0.001

0.038
0.019
0.194
0.028
0.118

0.050
0.016
0.185
0.024
0.123

0.049
0.021
0.094
0.024
0.109

0.049
0.005
0.023
0.018
0.098

-0.011
-0.002
0.100**
0.004
0.009

0.419
0.852
0.013
0.570
0.636

0.751
0.120
0.008
0.479
0.140

0.0170
-0.0054

0.0099
-0.0056

0.0185
-0.0118

0.0148
-0.0102

-0.0015
0.0064

0.825
0.288

0.751
0.130

E
Div
Debt
Adv
Ocf
Market Returns
Variables:
Disaster-Returns
Signing-Returns

Median

Difference

This table reports the summary statistics for the variables in our sample. The signing sample consists of 16 firms
who signed the North American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA). The 40 non-signing firms are from
the same industries as signing firms. The test statistics are based on the two-sided t-tests for mean difference (or
Wilcoxon nonparametric tests for median difference). The italicized numbers represent median values.
Variable Definitions:
Size
E
Div
Debt
Adv
Ocf
Disaster-returns

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Signing-returns

=

Natural logarithm of Market value of equity, US $mil
Income before extraordinary items divided by Sales
Dividends divided by Market value of equity
Long-term debt divided by Total assets
Advertising expense divided by Sales
Operating cash flow divided by Market value of equity
Firm’s two-day (day 0 and day +1) buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered around
the Bangladesh Disaster event date, when abnormal returns are measured by firmreturns minus equally-weighted market returns.
Firm’s two-day (day +1 and day +2) buy-and-hold abnormal returns centered
around the NAA Signing event date, when abnormal returns are measured by firmreturns minus equally-weighted market returns.
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TABLE 2: Prior Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Performance

Corporate Social
Responsibility Category

NAA
Signing Firms

NAA NonSigning Firms

Difference

(1)
Total All Categories:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

(2)

(3)

(4) = (2) –(3)

t-value

4.25
1.75
2.50

0.65
0.50
0.15

3.60
1.25
2.35

5.97***
2.18**
4.00***

Community:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.5625
0.0625
0.50

0.025
0.00
0.025

0.5375
0.0625
0.475

6.02***
1.60
5.29***

Corporate Governance:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.00
0.125
-0.125

0.00
0.05
-0.05

0.00
0.075
0.075

NA
0.98
0.98

Diversity:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.9375
0.1875
0.75

0.175
0.30
-0.125

0.7625
-0.1125
0.875

3.54***
-0.78
3.46***

Employee Relations:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

2.0625
0.6875
1.375

0.40
0.15
0.25

1.6625
0.5375
1.125

4.99***
2.42**
4.07***

Environment:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.50
0.3125
0.1875

0.025
0.00
0.025

0.475
0.3125
0.1625

4.47***
3.33***
1.74*

Human Rights:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

NA
NA
NA

Product:
Strengths
Concerns
Net Score (Strengths – Concerns)

0.1875
0.375
-0.1875

0.025
0.00
0.025

0.1625
0.375
-0.2125

2.19**
2.35**
-1.14

This table reports the CSR strengths, concerns, and net (strengths minus concerns) scores for our sample signing and
non-signing firms at the various category levels obtained from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) 2012 index.
For the “human rights” category in the 2012 KLD database, the mean values for “strengths” and “concerns” are zero
for both the signing and the non-signing group firms. The signing sample consists of 16 firms who signed the North
American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA). The non-signing group consists of 40 firms from the same
industries who did not sign the NAA. The KLD category descriptions are presented in Appendix C. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided paired ttests for mean difference.
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TABLE 3
Signing Decision Logistic Regressions: North American Alliance (NAA)
Commitmentit = 0 + 1*CSR-Netit-1 + 2*CSR-Strengthit-1 +3*CSR-Concernit-1 +4*Sizeit-1
+5*Advit-1 + 6*Eit-1 + 7* Dividendit-1 +8* Debtit-1 +9* Disaster-Returnsit + ɛi (1)

Model (1) Model (2)
(χ2-value) (χ2-value)
CSR-Net

Model (3)
(χ2-value)

0.501***
(8.68)

Model (4)
(χ2-value)

0.554**
(3.92)
0.741***
(10.35)
0.149
(0.12)

0.549*
(2.92)

2.164***
(9.98)
-2.847
(0.01)
-34.39*
(3.75)

-2.280***
(6.65)

73.412**
(4.37)
-19.490***
(10.15)

73.664**
(4.51)
-18.662***
(8.22)

2.609***
(8.12)
0.763
(0.00)
-41.594*
(3.44)
23.449*
(2.82)
1.380
(0.07)
87.077**
(4.48)
-24.193***
(7.93)

controlled controlled

controlled

controlled

controlled controlled

CSR-Concern
Size
Adv
E
Dividend
Debt
Disaster-Returns

Industry Fixed
Effect

Model (6)
(χ2-value)

0.607*
(3.40)
-0.428
(0.69)
2.023**
(6.53)
-2.588
(0.01)
-31.78*
(2.72)

CSR-Strength

Intercept

Model (5)
(χ2-value)

-0.940
(2.32)

0.623
(2.67)
-0.338
(0.29)
2.472**
(6.40)
0.783
(0.00)
-39.372*
(2.80)
23.769*
(2.82)
1.311
(0.07)
88.292**
(4.58)
-23.493***
(7.05)

56

56

56

56

56

56

Likelihood Ratio
χ2 (p-value)

13.79***
(0.003)

23.85***
(< 0.001)

39.66***
(< 0.001)

39.77***
(< 0.001)

42.05***
(< 0.001)

42.22***
(< 0.001)

Max-rescaled R2

0.32

0.50

0.73

0.73

0.76

0.76

Observation

This table reports the results of logistic regressions with the decision to sign or not to sign on to the North American
Alliance (NAA) as the dependent variable in the model. The regression uses 56 firms of which 16 signed the North
American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA) and 40 that did not sign in the same industries. In all six
models, the dependent variable, Commitment, is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to the
NAA and 0 if a firm did not. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent,
respectively, using two-sided t-tests.
CSR-Strength = the CSR strength scores at the various category levels obtained from the Kinder, Lydenberg,
Domini (KLD) 2012 index; CSR-Concern = the CSR concerns scores obtained from KLD 2012 index; CSR-Net =
the CSR net (strengths minus concerns) scores obtained from KLD 2012 index. See Table 1 for other variable
definitions and Appendix C for more information about the KLD index.
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TABLE 4
Market Returns OLS Regressions: Signing North American Alliance
Signing-Returnsit = 0 + 1* Commitmentit +2* CSR-Netit-1 + 3*CSR-Strengthit-1 +4*CSR-Concernit-1
+ 5*Sizeit-1 + 6*Advi-1 + 7*Eit-1 + 8*Divit-1 + 9*Debtit-1 + 10*Disaster-Returnsit + ɛi
(2)

Independent Variables:
Commitment

Model (1)
(p-value)
0.016**
(0.023)

CSR-Net

Model (2)
0.014*
(0.064)
0.001
(0.491)

CSR-Strength
CSR-Concern
Size
Adv
E
Div
Debt
Disaster-Returns
Intercept
Industry Fixed Effect
Observation
Adjusted R2

-0.003
(0.266)
-0.069
(0.478)
-0.076
(0.340)
0.052
(0.409)
-0.030
(0.127)
-0.630***
(<0.001)
-0.015
(0.397)
Controlled
56
0.36

-0.002
(0.301)
-0.087
(0.390)
-0.086
(0.293)
0.053
(0.396)
-0.035*
(0.099)
-0.614***
(<0.001)
-0.015
(0.405)
Controlled
56
0.35

Model (3)
0.014*
(0.074)

0.001
(0.511)
-0.001
(0.633)
-0.003
(0.329)
-0.087
(0.397)
-0.082
(0.334)
0.053
(0.407)
-0.035
(0.101)
-0.610***
(<0.001)
-0.017
(0.410)
Controlled
56
0.34

This table reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal
returns after the NAA signing date as the dependent variable in the model. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively, using two-sided t-tests. Commitment, is an indicator
variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to the NAA and 0 if a firm did not sign the NAA. See Table 1 for
other variable definitions.
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TABLE 5
Panel A: Summary Statistics for European Accord (EA) on Fire and Building Safety
Signing Firms

Mean

Median

Difference
Mean

Difference (p-value)
Wilcoxon
t-test
test
0.77
0.12
0.85
0.31

Raw Variables (US$ mil):

Mean

Total Assets
Income before Ext. Items

13,826.8
579.1

3,327.0
199.6

11,757.1
504.1

1,057.1
79.9

2,069.7
75.0

Sales
Common Shares Outstand.
Price close - Fiscal
Market Value
Stockholders’ Equity

20,377.0
845.2
110.0
11,018.4
4,303.3

4,980.8
200.7
17.3
3,581.8
1,636.0

17,959.3
427.2
23.9
2,060.2
2,707.4

2,862.4
81.7
9.2
701.6
400.5

2,417.8
418.0
86.0
8,958.2***
1,595.9

0.83
0.30
0.21
0.007
0.40

0.14
0.25
0.43
0.047
0.103

Long-term Debt
Dividends-Common Stock
Operating Cash flow
Scaled Variables:
Size
E

2,544.4
353.9
1,143.1

387.6
49.5
660.3

2,401.4
123.5
1,149.1

71.3
20.7
107.5

143.1
230.4
-6.0

0.92
0.15
0.99

0.16
0.66
0.14

7.809
0.017

8.152
0.025

6.602
0.035

6.548
0.023

1.207*
-0.018

0.055
0.41

0.047
0.00

0.024
0.162
0.585

0.017
0.195
0.122

0.044
0.113
0.628

0.037
0.107
0.113

-0.020
0.050
-0.043

0.13
1.40
0.94

0.12
0.16
0.66

-0.0100
0.0031

-0.0089
0.0084

-0.0047
0.0080

-0.0113
0.0040

-0.0053
-0.0049

0.50
0.47

0.66
0.96

Div
Debt
Ocf
Market Returns
Variables:
Disaster-Returns
Signing-Returns

Median

Non-Signing Firms

This table reports the summary statistics for the variables in our sample. The signing sample consists of 22 firms
who signed the European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA). The 22 non-signing firms are matched by
country, industry, and year. Specifically, the matched control firm we chose for each EA signatory company is the
firm with the most similar size of total assets (the next smallest or largest) within a specific 4-digit SIC industry in
the same country and year. All matched control firms did not sign the EA agreement. All variables are measured in
U.S. dollars. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively
using two-sided t-tests for mean difference (or Wilcoxon nonparametric tests for median difference). The italicized
numbers represent median values. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 5 (continued)
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Combined NAA and EA
Signing Firms

Mean

Median

Difference
Mean

Difference (p-value)
Wilcoxon
t-test
test
0.014
<0.001
0.07
0.013

Raw Variables (US$ mil):

Mean

Total Assets
Income before Ext. Items

18,144.2
1,024.0

7,690.2
252.3

5319.4
311.3

957.0
65.3

12,824.9**
712.7*

Sales
Common Shares Outstand.
Price close - Fiscal
Market Value
Stockholders’ Equity

32,855.3
663.1
88.0
17,236.8
6,231.4

11,369.1
194.8
32.5
6,821.8
2,824.5

8,548.0
209.7
31.3
3,125.2
1,562.5

1,895.1
49.8
19.2
976.5
448.1

24,307.3**
453.4**
56.7*
14,111.6***
4,669.0***

0.03
0.02
0.07
0.005
0.009

<0.001
0.001
0.12
<0.001
<0.001

Long-term Debt
Dividends-Common Stock
Operating Cash flow
Scaled Variables:
Size

3,657.4
431.0
1,815.3

1,072.9
57.8
842.6

1,002.4
71.8
598.9

40.0
12.8
97.5

2,655.0**
359.2***
1,216.4*

0.017
0.006
0.051

<0.001

8.351

8.790

6.971

6.871

1.380**

0.0003

<0.001

0.026
0.022
0.176
0.403

0.036
0.016
0.195
0.123

0.044
0.029
0.101
0.299

0.039
0.015
0.060
0.099

-0.018
-0.007
0.075***
0.104

0.14
0.38
0.002
0.69

0.63
0.94
<0.001
0.39

0.0014
-0.0005

0.0042
0.0002

0.0103
-0.0047

0.0085
-0.0045

-0.0089
0.0043

0.115
0.36

0.10
0.09

E
Div
Debt
Ocf
Market Returns
Variables:
Disaster-Returns
Signing-Returns

Median

Non-Signing Firms

0.008
<0.001

This table reports the summary statistics for the variables in our sample. The signing sample consists of 16 firms
who signed the North American Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (NAA) and 22 firms who signed the
European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA). For non-signing NAA sample, we use the entire non-signing 40
firms in the same industries of which NAA signing firms belong to. For non-signing EA sample, we use 22 nonsigning firms who are matched by country, industry, and year. All variables are measured in U.S. dollars. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively using two-sided t-tests
for mean difference (or Wilcoxon nonparametric tests for median difference). The italicized numbers represent
median values. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 6
Signing Decision Logistic Regressions: Combined NAA and EA
Commitmentit = 0 + 1*Sizeit-1 + 2*Eit-1 + 3* Dividendit-1
+4* Debtit-1 +5* Disaster-Returnsit + ɛi

Size
E

Model (1)
(χ2-value)

Model (2)
(χ2-value)

Model (3)
(χ2-value)

Model (4)
(χ2-value)

0.635***
(13.88)
-13.876***
(4.92)

0.649***
(14.84)
-14.765**
(5.23)

0.579***
(11.44)
-9.541
(2.62)
-8.285
(1.20)
3.535
(2.65)

-4.574***
(13.10)

-13.981
(1.53)
-4.672***
(14.12)

0.590***
(14.02)
-10.151*
(2.92)
-9.140
(1.37)
4.115*
(3.27)
-16.264
(2.38)
-4.740***
(14.2)

Dividend
Debt
DisasterReturns
Intercept
Industry Fixed
Effect
Observation
Likelihood
Ratio χ2
(p-value)
Max-rescaled
R2

(1)

controlled

-4.587***
(12.47)

controlled controlled controlled

100

100

100

100

26.51***
(<0.001)

28.08***
(<0.001)

30.50***
(<0.001)

32.87***
(<0.001)

0.32

0.33

0.36

0.38

This table reports the results of logistic regressions with the decision to sign or not to sign the North American
Alliance (NAA) or European Accord on Fire and Building Safety (EA) as the dependent variable in the model. In all
three models, the dependent variable, Commitment, is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to
the NAA or the EA agreement and 0 if a firm did not. All variables are measured in U.S. dollars. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively, using two-sided t-tests. See Table 1
for variable definitions.
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TABLE 7
Market Returns OLS Regressions: Signing either NAA or EA
Signing-Returnsit = 0 + 1* Commitmentit + 2*Sizeit-1 + 3*Eit-1 + 4*Divit-1
+ 5*Debtit-1 + 6*Disaster-Returnsit + 7*USFirmit + ɛi

Independent Variables:
Commitment

Model (1)
(p-value)
0.001
(0.845)

Model (2)

-0.248***
(0.006)
-0.016**
(0.011)

-0.211**
(0.016)
-0.015**
(0.017)

0.003
(0.393)
Controlled
100
0.15

0.006
(0.533)
Controlled
100
0.22

0.007
(0.473)
Controlled
100
0.20

E
Div
Debt
Disaster-Return
US Firm

Intercept
Industry Fixed Effect
Observation
Adjusted R2

Model (3)
0.004
(0.442)
-0.001
(0.543)
0.114***
(0.008)
-0.017
(0.752)
-0.008
(0.696)
-0.208**
(0.019)
-0.015**
(0.021)

Size

0.004
(0.441)
-0.001
(0.496)
0.119***
(0.004)

(2)

This table reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal
returns after the NAA or the EA signing date as the dependent variable in the model. All variables are measured in
U.S. dollars. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively,
using two-sided t-tests. Commitment, is an indicator variable, coded with value 1 if a firm signed on to the NAA or
the EA agreement and 0 if a firm did not. US Firm is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is a U.S.
firm, 0 if a firm is not. See Table 1 for other variable definitions.
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